Is the Postwar Order Over? A Conversation with Ambassador David Satterfield

Published: April 08, 2026

At a time of mounting geopolitical uncertainty, the World Affairs Council of Atlanta and Georgia Tech’s Sam Nunn School of International Affairs convened a timely fireside chat titled “Strategic Challenges and Opportunities for the United States: Is the Post‑War Order Over?” Former Ambassador Lawrence Silverman led a wide‑ranging conversation with former Ambassador David Satterfield, probing whether the global system the United States helped build after World War II is unraveling—and what might come next. 

From the outset, Satterfield was unequivocal: the postwar order is indeed changing, fading, and reconfiguring all at once. But to understand why, he argued, requires looking well beyond recent crises or specific leaders and instead examining decades-long structural forces that have reshaped societies, economies, and trust in institutions across the developed world. 

The Exceptional Nature of the Postwar Order 

Satterfield emphasized that what is often referred to as the “global order” was a product of a historically exceptional moment. The period following World War II was defined by two reinforcing frameworks. The first was the bipolar geopolitical structure of the Cold War, in which the United States and its allies pursued a clear and widely understood strategy of containment against the Soviet Union. This clarity mattered. The adversary was identifiable, the stakes were evident, and public support for the strategy was broad-based and sustained. 

Equally important, but often overlooked, was a second framework: extraordinary socioeconomic growth. From the 1940s through the early 1970s, the United States and much of Europe experienced a sustained rise in living standards that was historically anomalous. For several decades, expectations of progress were not only high but fulfilled. Stable employment, pensions, education, and upward mobility came to feel normal—even guaranteed. 

That convergence of geopolitical clarity and domestic prosperity gave Americans and others confidence in their place in the world and in the institutions guiding national policy. Once that convergence broke down, so did the foundations of the postwar order. 

The Long Decline of Expectations 

According to Satterfield, the critical rupture began in the 1970s, when the curve of socioeconomic progress flattened. Deindustrialization, shifting labor costs, and technological change reshaped global production in ways no single actor controlled or could reverse. Heavy industry migrated from the United States to Europe, then to East Asia, and eventually to China—following patterns of cost and specialization that were economically rational but politically destabilizing. 

Crucially, Satterfield stressed that this was not just an American phenomenon. Across Europe, Japan, and other developed economies, generations have now lived with the unsettling reality that their lives will likely be less materially secure than those of their parents. Managing rising expectations is politically challenging; managing declining ones is profoundly destabilizing. 

This sense of economic displacement has been compounded by rapid technological disruption, from automation to artificial intelligence, and by cultural change that, however justified or necessary, adds to feelings of dislocation for those already struggling to adapt. 

Erosion of Trust—and the Rise of Populism 

Overlaying these economic pressures has been a collapse of trust in institutions and elites. Satterfield pointed to the fragmentation of the media landscape, the rise of social media, and the end of a shared factual narrative as accelerants of this erosion. Where earlier generations consumed common sources of news, today’s publics inhabit parallel realities, reinforcing skepticism toward authority and expertise. 

Foreign policy failures—including Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—have further discredited the postwar “blob,” as Satterfield termed the bipartisan foreign policy establishment. The cumulative effect has been a widespread rejection of establishment parties and governing elites, not because alternatives inspire deep trust, but because voters feel they have little left to lose. 

This dynamic, replicated across the United States and Europe, has fueled nationalist and populist movements that thrive on grievance, identity, and blame. These movements, Satterfield argued, are less the cause of systemic breakdown than its product—sharpening edges forged over decades. 

A World Without a Coherent Order 

In such an environment, Satterfield contended, diplomacy alone cannot rebuild global order. Instead, it has become a tool for managing consequences in a multipolar world defined by distrust, non-state actors, and transactional alliances. The Cold War’s ideological coherence has been replaced by ad hoc coalitions formed for specific purposes, in specific regions, at specific moments. 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine accelerated this transition by openly rejecting core principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. For Satterfield, Ukraine represents a test not only of U.S. credibility, but of whether sovereignty remains a meaningful organizing value in international affairs. If it does not, the erosion will not stop with Ukraine—particularly for countries on Russia’s periphery. 

Yet sustaining alliances today requires something Cold War leaders rarely had to do: convincingly explain to domestic audiences why commitments abroad serve their interests at home. Without that articulation, support for alliances like NATO becomes vulnerable to narratives that prioritize domestic repair over foreign engagement. 

China, Russia, and Strategic Competition 

Turning to great power rivalry, Satterfield drew a sharp distinction between Russia and China. Russia, he argued bluntly, is a declining power whose chief threat lies in its weapons, not its long-term economic or demographic vitality. China, by contrast, is an ascending power with vast human capital, technological capacity, and industrial sophistication. 

The appropriate U.S. response, he said, is not containment in the Cold War sense, but a mix of confrontation, cooperation, and intense competition—particularly in global markets and innovation. How that approach unfolds politically, however, remains uncertain, especially amid unpredictable diplomatic styles and rhetorical excess. 

Regional Flashpoints: Iran, Turkey, and Lebanon 

The conversation also addressed the Middle East, where Satterfield expressed concern over Iran’s demonstrated ability to disrupt global trade through the Strait of Hormuz. More broadly, he argued that recent conflicts have not weakened Iran’s regime but instead revealed the limits of military power to force political outcomes. 

On Turkey, Satterfield described a pivotal NATO ally whose strategic value remains immense despite democratic backsliding under President Erdoğan. Turkey’s pragmatic balancing between Russia and the West, he said, reflects both geopolitical necessity and Erdoğan’s own ambition to position Turkey as a transcendent regional power. 

Lebanon, meanwhile, stands as a stark example of state failure rooted in internal dysfunction rather than external imposition. While reform is possible, Satterfield warned that entrenched elites and armed non-state actors—particularly Hezbollah—continue to block meaningful recovery. 

What Comes Next? 

Satterfield offered no easy prescriptions. The era of grand designs and sweeping world orders is over, at least for now. What remains essential, he concluded, is honesty: a clear-eyed articulation to citizens about what their governments can and cannot do, what values truly matter, and what costs they are willing to bear. Without that candor, diplomacy will remain reactive, alliances brittle, and global stability elusive. 

As the conversation made clear, the postwar order did not collapse overnight—and whatever replaces it will emerge not through rhetoric, but through sustained political reckoning at home. 

View the event photo gallery here. Flickr